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Introduction: Health Care and Human Persons
Despite the ethical pluralism that exists in the modem health care setting
and the "radical moral disagreement,,1 it often leads to, I think it is safe to
assume that all health care professionals would agree that the chief goal of
medicine is fulfilling the health needs of the human person. 2 To restore
health and to help people maintain it is a matter of fulfilling human needs.
Therefore, to think clearly about ethical dilemmas in modem medicine it is
important to have an adequate conception of what it means to be a human
person, because health care, in sustaining health, serves the basic good of
human life, of which health is a vital dimension. 3

I. Different Views of Personhood
Today there are many different notions of what it means to be a
4
person. Some of these notions are materialistic, in the sense that they
deny that human beings have a spirit or soul. According to this view, the
human being is essentially reducible to his or her brain and central nervous
system, since it is with these parts (and nothing more) of the human person
that I think and communicate.5 Other views are radically dualistic, that is,
they separate bodily life from personal life. Those who hold this view are
fond of making a distinction between being human and being a person. In

August, 200 I

241

this understanding, a "person" is one who is self-aware, able to
communicate, and autonomous. If a member of the human family lacks
these characteristics, we could call this individual human but we could not
call him a person. 6 There are also some anthropological views that would
equate animal life with human life. This equal species anthropology
maintains that it is wrong to discriminate on the basis of species, i.e., to
treat human life as more valuable than nonhuman life. 7
The view, I would argue, that has the most to say for itself is the one
8
which understands the human person as a bodily being with a difference.
Rather than separate human nature from personhood, this view rightly
holds that one' s body is an integral aspect of one' s identity as a person.
Moreover, against materialism, this view would affirm that man is capable
of transcending his physicality because he is endowed with an immaterial
intellect or soul. In this nondualistic view of the person both "body" and
"soul" together form a unified whole. Those who follow this much older
thinking about the nature of the human person, define personhood as
"embodied intelligent freedom .,,9 This tradition also sees the human person
as existing and finding fulfillment in a network of other human persons,
i.e., as part of a community ofpersons.
Obviously, these various conceptions of the human person will have
implications for how one evaluates moral dilemmas in health care. Indeed,
our understanding of the person is, in many ways, more fundamental than
the moral principles and norms that articulate for us morally upright
courses of action. But why more fundamental?

II. Anthropological Starting Points for Ethics,
Including Health Care Ethics
More fundamental because the starting point for ethics is two central
features of human persons: their intelligent freedom and their desire for
happiness. 1o Morality, whether is it in the field of health care, politics, or
law takes into account the fact that human persons are capable of making
free choices which concern the kind of people they are going to be. That is,
at the heart of every external deed resides a choice that forms and expresses
one' s moral identity or character.' 1 For example, one ' s choice to become a
doctor or a nurse was (is) a self-determining choice that influences one's
life in a profound and perduring way.
Morality is also concerned with the achievement of true happiness for
oneself and all human persons in community. Indeed, seeking lasting
happiness for oneself is the overarching goal that structures all of one's
choices and gives them meaning. Some philosophers describe this state of
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personal completeness or harmonious wholeness as integral human

fulfillment .12
The basic principles and norms of morality exist to serve the end of
integral human fulfilIment. Often, however, persons are in need of medical
care because of a particular malady that threatens their health or even their
life. If we understand health to be an essential need of the person, and its
satisfaction a dimension of one' s integral human fulfilIment or happiness,
restoring health is one of the ways - indeed, for health care workers it is
the primary way - of contributing to the integral human fulfilIment of
persons.

III. Personhood and Health Care Ethics
In the context of health care, one' s view of the human person will
guide how one applies various principles of morality to difficult cases. For
example, if one's understanding of personhood sharply distinguishes
between being human and being a person, then, usually the very young
(e.g., unborn children and infants - especially defective ones) and the very
old (e.g., especially the severely incompetent) will not be viewed as
persons in the proper sense. Therefore, one need not always treat them as
beings who are the subjects of human rights and thus entitled to our full
respect.
Similarly, if one views the human person dualistically, thus separating
bodily life from the person as a conscious subject of itself, then,
intentionalIy depriving the severely handicapped - whether young or old and the irreversibly comatose - whether young or old - of their bodily life
cannot be regarded as the intentional killing of a human person. 13 Or, at
least, if it is regarded as killing a person, it is justified on grounds of either
"the lesser of two evils" or some "greater good" that one hopes to
14
.
·
ac hteve.
T hese two erroneous accounts of the human person are qUIte
common in our culture today and they underlie the arguments advanced in
support of abortion, euthanasia, physician-assisted suicide, and other
immoral practices. They often are summarized in the expression "quality
of life ethic." In contrast, for those who view the human person
nondualistically, the bodily component of the individual is also personal,
that is, it too shares in the dignity of the person. Because the good of
bodily life is an integral dimension of who one is, choices to terminate the
lives of those who have irretrievably lost their capacity for conscious
awareness and for communicating meaningfully to other conscious
subjects, are immora1. 15 They are choices to take the lives of human
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persons, not "lumps of flesh." This view of the person is commonly
referred to as the "sanctity of human life ethic. ,,16

IV. Moral Truth, Moral Principles, and Integral Human Fulfillment
What now of morality? What is the role in health care, especially
health care dilemmas? And how is it related to the fulfillment of persons?
We have already spoken of three central anthropological features of human
persons: (1) they are bodily beings; (2) they are able to make free choices;
and (3) they seek integral human fulfillment or happiness. The task of
morality is to provide objective ·norms or guidelines for directing our
freedom so that our choices, including health care choices, are made in
accord with moral truth. A choice that is made in accord with moral truth
is one that respects the total well being, the happiness, the integral human
fulfillment of the person. In fact, the ''first principle of morality" itself can
be stated as follows : that in every act that carries out some choice one
should respect integral human fulfillm ent. 17 That is, one should choose in
such a way that one respects each and every basic good or value of human
existence. Among these goods is human life itself, including health, bodily
integrity, and the handing on and educating of new human life, playful
activities and skillful performances, knowledge, self-integration, practical
reasonableness, friendship, and religion. 18 All of them are equally
fundamental and intrisically good. Fully realized and actualized in all
human lives, they would constitute integral human fulfillment, total human
happiness.
However, many different sorts of choices do not respect the first
principle of morality, and hence, do not respect the person(s) in whom the
basic goods are meant to exist. Among them would include alternatives of
choice that ignore, slight, neglect, arbitrarily limit, damage, destroy, or
impede some basic human good(s) in oneself or in another person(s).19
Each of these ways of choosing violates some aspect of the human person ' s
dignity; each manifests a way of choosing that is incompatible with an
openness and love for all goods of human persons. And, as we know, in
the field of health care there are not only opportunities for doing good to
patients, but also many opportunities for doing harm to them. For example,
we can harm the good of truth by lying to our patients or by ignoring our
patients' right to informed consent.

V. Health Care, Ethical Theory, and the "Four Principles of Bioethics"
Many bioethicists today are fond of an ethical system of "common
morality based on moral principles." One such ethical system is based on
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an ethical methodology which consists of 'jour principles ": beneficence,
nonmaleficence, autonomy, and justice. 20 While each of these principles is
certainly important in any articulation of a bioethical theory, they are not
sufficient by themselves, especially when divorced from the
anthropological foundations of ethics and from the other principles of
morality that were formulated above. Moreover, there are too many
challenges that such a bioethical theory faces and is not able to withstand.
One such challenge, among many others, is subjection to the "technological
imperative." The "four principles" approach is not able to adequately
respond to those who say, " if we can do something, then we should do
something." Thus, in addition to the four principles, we need both a focus
on the dignity of the human person and a wider set of moral principles in
order to make good health care decisions 21 - whether in difficult cases or in
the simpler ones.

VI. Health Care Dilemmas: Care for the Dying at the End of Life
In this last section of my paper I shall treat some of the issues with
respect to care for the dying patient at the end of life. For someone who
adopts the anthropology and moral methodology that I articulated earlier,
what might an approach to this matter look like? My specific focus here
will be on the ethical problems that arise in the care of the dying
(competent or incompetent) adult patient. What are the moral criteria and
principles that are necessary to deal with various dilemmas that arise in the
care of such patients? I will first articulate these general criteria/principles
and then go on to apply them to the difficult case of assisted nutrition and
hydration of the permanently comatose/unconscious patient.22
Traditional ethics has tended to reject "quality of life" decisions in
favor of a moral analysis that focuses on the obligatory or nonobligatory
character of a particular medical treatment. In deciding whether to
withhold or withdraw treatment from a sick patient, two criteria are
necessary.23 First, one must determine whether the continued use of a
treatment isfutile, i.e., of no therapeutic benefit. Second, the question must
be asked whether the treatment (not the patient's life!) imposes an
excessive burden (such as pain, indignity, risk, cost, etc.) which is not in
proportion to the benefit gained or hoped for.
By using these two criteria, the health care worker, in the words of the
moral philosophers John Finnis and Anthony Fisher, O.P., "does not
indulge in arbitrary ' quality of life' decision-making, but rather makes a
(sometimes difficult) therapeutic judgment about the helpfulness or not of
the proposed medical treatment in dealing with the patient' s illness. On
this basis some treatments will be medically indicated and morally required
August, 200 I
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('ordinary'); others will be optional (,extraordinary'); and still others wiII
be contraindicated (and immora\).,,24
With regard to the difficult moral problems of whether to artificially
feed and hydrate the irreversibly comatose, there are, admittedly, divergent
opinions, even among conservative Roman Catholic and Protestant ethicists
and bishops.25 However, given the nondualistic anthropology that we have
argued in favor of, even the very reduced and deficient life of the
irreversibly comatose remains intrinsically good; it is the very existence of
an irreplaceable and nonsubstitutable body-person who can still be
harmed, e.g., by being subjected to indignities. Thus, I would argue, that
unless these patients are immanently dying or unable to assimilate the
nourishment and fluids provided, then feeding and hydrating them remains
morally required because it is a benefit to them, namely, it sustains their
lives - lives which, despite their debilitated condition, remain instances of
a basic human good. 26
This moral stance is not, however, to be identified with "vitalism,"
that is, the view that we are obligated to maintain human life, especially socalled mere "biological life," at all cost even if the burdens outweigh the
benefits. On the contrary, as already noted, we are not obligated to use
"extraordinary" means of treatment; but generally, in these cases, I do
believe feeding and hydrating provide the patient with a benefit and are not
overly burdensome. Moreover, recalling our nondualistic anthropology, we
must affirm that the bodily lives of those who have permanently lost
consciousness are still personal. We cannot divide the person in two and
say that the unconscious body that lies before us is no longer the person
that we knew and loved. The life of this individual remains inherently the
very life of a human person. In other words, human life, however
burdened, is always a good of the human person, and not merely a goodfor
the person. Thus, to quote William E. May, et aI., "remaining alive is never
rightly regarded as rendering a benefit.,,27
In treating the permanently unconscious or those in severe pain or
with an incurable sickness, the standard of care that all health care
professionals must aim for is a compassion which forswears not only
"direct" killing, but one which promotes and protects their well-being,
alleviates their pain, and assists them in their bodily, emotional, and
spiritual needs. It is only this kind of care that will ensure "dignity in
dying," rather than "death with dignity."

Conclusion: Why Morality in Health Care?
Why should we be concerned with morality in the field of health
care? As human persons, one of our greatest needs is our need for moral
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truth. 28 Morality guides us to the satisfaction of that need. And we satisfy
it by choosing well, that is, in accord with the integral human fulfillment of
persons. We might look at the matter this way: the fundamental principles
and norms of morality direct us to the basic goods which fulfill us as
persons and they also show us the way to choose these goods in morally
upright ways, so that we might more fully participate in them. It is only by
participating in these goods, including the goods of life and health, that we
perfect ourselves and become the "complete", i.e., happy beings we are
called to be by our Creator. 29
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